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INTERPRETING MONTANA'S PATHBREAKING

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM EMPLOYMENT
ACT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Leonard Bierman*
Stuart A. Youngblood**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987 the Montana Legislature enacted its pathbreaking
"Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act" (WDFEA).1 With
this legislation Montana became the first state in the nation to
statutorily protect employees from "wrongful discharge." 2 Because
of its pathbreaking nature, the Act has received considerable attention in the national press, 3 and been discussed extensively by
leading employment law scholars." It is clear that Montana's
WDFEA serves as a paradigm for other states considering legislation of this kind, and indeed the "Uniform Employment Termination Act" recently drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State5 Laws contains several provisions
modeled after the WDFEA.

* Associate Professor of Management, College of Business Administration, Texas A&M
University.
** Associate Professor of Management, College of Business Administration, Texas
A&M University.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 914 (1991). For an excellent analysis of the legislative history of this statute see Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REv. 94 (1990).
2. For over a decade prior to the Montana law's enactment, leading employment law
scholars had been calling for such legislation. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976). But, until the
Montana Legislature's 1987 enactment, no state in the nation had paid heed to such scholarly pronouncements.
3. See, e.g., Barrett, Wrongful-Dismissal Laws May Feel Effect of Dispute Before
Montana's High Court, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at B1, col. 3; Dockser, Wrongful-Firing
Case in Montana May Prompt Laws in Other States, Wall St. J., July 3, 1989, at B10, col.
1.
4.

See, e.g., Weiler, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-

MENT LAWS 96-99 (1990); Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEa. L. REV. 7, 18-19 (1988); St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 58, 74-75 (1988); Gould, Job Security in the United States: Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation From a Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 28, 41 (1988). Professors Weiler,
Summers, St. Antoine and Gould teach, respectively, at the Harvard, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, and Stanford law schools.
5. For the text of the draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act ("Draft Act") see
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS MAN. 540:21 (BNA) (1991). See also Schramm, supra note 1,
at 116 and n. 132. There are some significant areas, though, in which the Draft Act differs
considerably from the WDFEA. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1991) (leaving
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Consequently, the operation and interpretation of the
WDFEA is of considerable importance not just to directly affected
employees and employers, but also to those in other jurisdictions
looking to it as a model statute. What follows is thus a preliminary
analysis of how the WDFEA has been interpreted and applied during its past approximately five years of existence.
II.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

A.

Overview

The constitutionality of the WDFEA has been challenged in
three cases before the Montana Supreme Court. The primary challenge came in the case of Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc.' where the
court, in a wide, sweeping opinion, upheld the constitutionality of
the Act. Shortly thereafter, in Johnson v. State,7 the court further
upheld the constitutionality of the Act in a short opinion based on
Meech. Finally, in the June 4, 1991 case of Allmaras v. Yellowstone Basin Properties,s the Montana Supreme Court further upheld the constitutionality of the WDFEA against a myriad of new
constitutional challenges.
B.

Meech v. Hilihaven West, Inc.

The Meech decision, as other observers have pointed out," was
a seminal one in terms of its interpretation of the Montana Constitution and the ability of the Montana Legislature to enact laws
modifying common-law remedies. In Meech, the Montana Supreme
Court overruled its earlier holding in White v. State ° and held
that the proper test to apply to a piece of legislation which reduced
common-law remedies was whether the legislation had a "rational
basis" meeting a "legitimate state interest," and not whether the
legislation met a "compelling state interest."'1
From an employment law perspective, however, Meech is important because it illustrates the realistic types of tradeoffs which
may be necessary if a state legislature is to enact a wrongful disthe employee's requisite probationary period up to the employer) with Draft Act § 3(b)
(establishing a one-year probationary period). INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS MAN. 540:29
(BNA) (1991).
6. 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
7. 238 Mont. 215, 776 P.2d 1221 (1989).
8. 248 Mont. 477, 812 P.2d 770 (1991).
9. See Schramm, supra note 1, at 112-15.
10. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
11. Meech, 238 Mont. at 43-52, 776 P.2d at 496-502.
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charge statute. Section 913 of the Montana WDFEA' 2 explicitly
mandates that "[e]xcept as provided in this part no claim may
arise from tort or express or implied contract." Thus, pursuant to
this statutory provision, the WDFEA preempts traditional common-law remedies in tort and contract for "wrongful discharge" in
Montana. Despite the deleterious impact this has on employee
rights, Professor Clyde Summers seems correct in his assessment 3
that a tradeoff of this kind is necessary if states are going to successfully enact wrongful discharge legislation. Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court seems correct in its holding in Meech that
this tradeoff is one which is "rationally related" to a "legitimate
state interest."
At the heart of the court's decision in Meech is something of a
costs/benefits 'analysis of the WDFEA. The court noted that the
legislative history of the Act had demonstrated that "lawmakers
perceived an unreasonable financial threat to Montana employers
from large judgments in common-law wrongful discharge claims." 4
The court pointed out that testimony indicated to the legislature
that the large judgments in these types of cases could have the
effect of discouraging employers from locating their businesses in
Montana. 5 Thus, the limitations in the WDFEA on punitive damages and on the bringing of independent causes of action could be
seen as helping improve the state's economic climate. 6 While the
WDFEA put limits on the ability of employees to bring common
law actions and recover damages in "unjust dismissal" cases, the
Montana Supreme Court was quick to point out that the legislation also conferred considerable benefits on employees.' 7 Most significantly, the court noted that employers in Montana would generally no
longer be able to discharge an employee without
"cause." 18 Instead, as a rule employers would be free to discharge
non-probationary employees only if they could show "good cause,"
meaning some sort of reasonable job-related basis for the action.' 9
The court asserted that this statutory "just cause" provision represented considerable new protection for the vast majority of Mon12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (1991).
13. See Summers, supra note 4, at 18-19. For a further discussion along the same line
of reasoning, see Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United
States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644 (1991).
14. 238 Mont. at 48, 776 P.2d at 504.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 50-51, 776 P.2d at 505-06.
18. Id. at 51, 776 P.2d at 506.
19. Id. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1991).
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tana employees.2 0
Finally, the Montana Supreme Court in Meech emphasized
perhaps the most significant aspect of the WDFEA - the fact that
2 As a recent
it provides certainty.
empirical study of the evolution
of unjust-dismissal legislation and legislative proposals points out,
the development of state court common-law remedies for "unjust
dismissal" has created a considerable degree of uncertainty for
both employers and employees.22 Indeed, the present common-law
remedy system has operated a little bit like "Russian roulette,"
with employees occasionally winning lottery-size dollar awards but
often receiving little or nothing at all. Conversely, employers are
occasionally subjected to million-dollar plus judgments, but often
get off scot-free.2 Moreover, the court in Meech also noted the
considerable legal and other transaction costs involved in commonlaw "unjust dismissal" litigation, and how many employees had
difficulty availing themselves of their common-law remedies because of the requisite expenses.2 ' Indeed, a recent survey found
combined employee and employer legal fees to, on average, exceed
$150,000 in such cases.2 5 By providing a clear-cut and inexpensive
remedial process for "unjust dismissal" cases the Montana Supreme Court in Meech held that the WDFEA served a legitimate
state purpose.2 6
The court's holding in Meech was met, however, with a stinging dissent by Justice Sheehy, joined by Justice Hunt.2 7 Justice
Sheehy wrote that the day the court decided Meech represented
"the blackest judicial day in the eleven years" he had sat on the
Montana Supreme Court." Justice Sheehy argued strenuously that
the WDFEA had not provided any new rights for discharged workers, emphasizing that all such rights had heretofore been provided
under common law.29 He further contended that the new law was
discriminatory in that it imposed "upon wrongfully discharged employees the burden of subsidizing a better business climate for
wrongdoing employers," and that it is not a "legitimate state pur20. 238 Mont. at 51, 776 P.2d at 506.
21. Id.
22. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 646-50.
23. See generally Krueger, supra note 13.
24. 238 Mont. at 51-52, 776 P.2d at 506 (citing Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404, 413 (1988)).
25. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 650.
26. 238 Mont. at 50, 776 P.2d at 505-06.
27. Id. at 52-69, 776 P.2d at 507-17. Justice Harrison wrote a separate dissent concurring partially with Justice Sheehy. Id. at 73-74, 776 P.2d at 520.
28. Id. at 52, 776 P.2d at 507.
29. Id. at 53-54, 776 P.2d at 507.
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pose to protect employers from their unscrupulous acts. ' 30
Justice Sheehy's arguments, however, seem somewhat specious. While many of the rights provided for Montana workers
under the WDFEA were indeed provided by common-law, the
WDFEA clearly added an element of certainty to the rubric of employee protection that was clearly never there before. Thus, it
seems that the tradeoffs involved in the WDFEA do more than
simply subsidize a "better business climate" or "protect employers
from their unscrupulous acts." While the certainty contained in
the WDFEA certainly benefits employers, it also benefits workers.31 Consequently, it seems that the WDFEA does, overall, promote legitimate state interests on behalf of both these groups.
C.

Johnson v. State

3

Johnson 1 was decided shortly after the Meech case, and
turned on the same issues raised in Meech. The plaintiff in Johnson asserted that the WDFEA operated to deprive her of "full legal redress" and that no "compelling state interest" had been
shown to justify this deprivation of rights.3 3 The Montana Supreme Court dismissed this assertion pursuant to Meech, holding
that the state legislature had the power to alter common-law
causes of actions and remedies without demonstrating a "compelling state interest."3 Justice Sheehy, for the reasons he expressed
in his Meech dissent, emphatically dissented from this decision.3 5
D. Allmaras v. Yellowstone Basin Properties
Allmaras3 6 represents the most recent challenge to the constitutionality of the WDFEA and was decided by the Montana Supreme Court on June 4, 1991. In this case the plaintiffs, in addition
to alleging wrongful discharge pursuant to the WDFEA, also
brought charges of common-law discharge and a violation of the
"implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ' 37 The state trial
court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the latter two counts on the grounds that they had been
preempted by the WDFEA. When the plaintiffs lost their jury trial
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 67, 776 P.2d at 516.
See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
238 Mont. 215, 776 P.2d 1221 (1989).
238 Mont. 215-16, 776 P.2d 1221.
Id. at 216, 776 P.2d at 1221-22.
Id. at 217, 776 P.2d at 1222.
248 Mont. 477, 812 P.2d 770 (1991).
248 at 479, 812 P.2d at 771..
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on the first count, they appealed raising a variety of new constitu38
tional challenges to the WDFEA.
The first constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs was
that the WDFEA, by placing a cap on the amount of damages recoverable for wrongful discharge, violates the right of juries to determine damages pursuant to the Montana Constitution. 3 The
Montana Supreme Court dismissed this constitutional challenge
for lack of "standing," holding that since the plaintiffs were found
by a jury not to have been wrongfully discharged under the
WDFEA, they were not directly injured by the Act's cap on damages. Consequently, they lacked legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act's limitations in this regard. °
The plaintiffs in Alimaras further alleged that the WDFEA
violated the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses
of the Montana Constitution. The gist of their argument was that
the WDFEA operated unfairly in that certain groups of employees,
e.g., those covered by collective bargaining and other agreements,
are excluded from the Act's coverage while employees such as the
plaintiffs are included under the ambit of the Act and prohibited
from seeking common-law remedies."1 The Montana Supreme
Court was quick to point out, however, that common-law remedies
were never available to employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements or other contracts who were required to pursue remedies under these agreements.4 2 Common-law remedies were only
available to "at will" employees such as the plaintiffs, and since
the WDFEA now provides the same general scope of coverage by
statute the court held that the plaintiffs were not adversely affected by (and thus lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of) the WDFEA.13 Moreover, the court, pursuant to its decision in Meech, held that the state legislature had the power to
pass, for legitimate policy reasons, statutes that "take away causes
of action or constrict liability."" Thus, the Montana Supreme
Court struck down the plaintiffs' charges that the WDFEA unconstitutionally eliminated their common-law rights and remedies.
The plaintiffs in Allmaras also raised claims that the WDFEA
unconstitutionally violated the contracts- clause of the Montana
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
776 P.2d

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 481, 812 P.2d at 772.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482, 812 P.2d at 773 (citing Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 33,
488, 495 (1989)).
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Constitution as well as substantive due process. 5 The Montana
Supreme Court found these claims not fully documented and generally superfluous." All the justices of the court concurred with the
47
Allmaras opinion.
E.

Summary

In Meech and Allmaras the Montana Supreme Court broadly
upheld the constitutionality of the WDFEA. While the court's
opinion in Almaras leaves open some questions, such as whether
the Act's limitation on damages violates the right of juries to determine damages under the Montana Constitution, it seems highly
likely that the state high court will continue to construe the Montana Constitution in such a way as to uphold the WDFEA. The
court, as it forcefully expressed in Meech, feels that the Act represents a positive furthering of legitimate state interests and a reasonable "tradeoff" of rights from the perspective of both employers
and employees.
III.

DEFINING "GOOD CAUSE"

A.

Overview

The most significant section of the WDFEA is probably Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-904(2), which states that for
non-probationary employees a discharge is "wrongful" if it was not
for "good cause."' 8 The statute in section 39-2-903(5) then defines
"good cause" to mean "reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason."' 9 This definition, however, while reasonably specific, still
leaves considerable room for interpretation, a job the Montana Supreme Court embarked on in the cases of Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc.5 0 and Cecil v. CardinalDrilling Co.5 1
B.

Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc.

Buck involved a plaintiff who for nearly fifteen years had
served as a top executive at a car dealership principally owned by
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

Id. at 483, 812 P.2d at 773.
Id.
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1991).
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1991).
248 Mont. 276, 811 P.2d 537 (1991).
244 Mont. 405, 797 P.2d 232 (1990).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1992

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

his father-in-law. 2 The plaintiff's employment with his father-inlaw's company was without a contract or specified term, and when
the auto dealership was sold to another company the plaintiff was
discharged.5 3 There was no question regarding Buck'. considerable
competence, and the acquiring company offered him a lesser managerial slot with the dealership if he wanted to stay with the firm.54
The acquiring company, though, had a tradition of putting its own
long-term employees in the top dealership jobs and then frequently affording these employees the chance to purchase the dealership. The company pursued this same strategy at Billings Montana Chevrolet. 5 The plaintiff decided not to accept the proffered
lower level managerial position and brought suit for "wrongful discharge" under the WDFEA. He asserted that his discharge was not
for "good cause."56
In reviewing the charge, the Montana Supreme Court noted
that the original legislative definition of "good cause" for discharge
did not contain the phrase "legitimate business reason," and that
the Montana Legislature specifically added this language to allow
for discharges based on "legitimate economic reasons such as lack
of work or elimination of the job." 57 The court observed that this
language protected employee interests by mandating that employers have a "legitimate" reason for the discharge, while at the same
time affording management the discretion "to make employment
decisions for business reasons."5 8
The Montana Supreme Court conceded, however, that the legislature had not provided any precise definition of the term "legitimate business reason."5 Interestingly, the court further noted that
precise guidance was not available on the question from other
cases in Montana or elsewhere.6 0 The court thus formulated its
own definition of the term as follows:
52. 248 Mont. at 279, 811 P.2d at 539.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 280, 811 P.2d at 540.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. In his classic article Professor Clyde Summers stated that this "uncharted territory" has long been "mapped in considerable detail by arbitrators." See supra note 2, at
521. The Montana Supreme Court in Buck confusingly states that it examined "arbitration
cases from the National Labor Relations Board." 248 Mont. at 281, 811 P. 2d at 540. The
NLRB, however, does not really "arbitrate" cases, and there is no indication that the court
looked in the best possible place for guidance-the large amassed body of arbitral decisions
and law.
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[a] legitimate business reason is a reason that is neither false,
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must have some logical
relationship to the needs of the business. In applying this definition, one must take into account the right of an employer to exercise discretion over who it will employ and keep in employment.
Of equal importance to this right, however, is the legitimate interests of the employee to secure employment.'
The court then went on to apply this definition to the case at bar.
The court noted that the plaintiff was an "exemplary employee" but that the acquiring company had a general policy of
putting its own people in the top dealership management slot
which had been held by the plaintiff. The court observed that this
was a logical business policy for the acquiring company particularly because it was based in Louisiana, and thus had particular
needs to see that its Montana operations were supervised by someone it could clearly trust.2" The court held that "[i]t would be
against common sense and rationality" for it to hold that such justifications "do not constitute a legitimate business reason" of the
kind set forth in section 39-2-903(5) of the Act. 3 The court stated
that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was not "false, whimsical, arbitrary nor capricious and it had a logical relationship to the
needs of the business."64
In an aside, however, the court cautioned that its holding in
Buck was "confined only to those employees who occupy sensitive
managerial or confidential positions. 6 5 The court held that under
the same circumstances an owner might not "hold the right to terminate employees who hold duties which do not require the exercise of broad discretion." 6 The court then directly stated that "[a]
company's interest in protecting its investment and in running its
business as it sees fit is not as strong when applied to lower echelon employees, and may therefore be outweighed by their interest
in continued, secure employment."6
While the distinction between upper echelon and lower echelon employees in terms of employment rights is one which has
commanded considerable scholarly attention,6 8 and is one directly
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
REV. 947

Buck, 248 Mont. at 281-82, 811 P.2d at 540.
Id. at 282, 811 P.2d at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs In High Places, 95
(1982).
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incorporated in other statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act,6 9 it is not one which is directly incorporated into the
WDFEA.
The distinction is, however, one which raises important issues
regarding who is most likely to need unjust dismissal protection
and at what organizational level that protection should be overridden by the rights of management to manage the workplace. Results
from recent empirical studies have been mixed, with some studies
showing that unskilled and semi-skilled workers are most in need
of this type of protection,70 while other studies have pointed to the
71
strong need for this type of protection at the executive level.
Moreover, to the extent that firms continue the present trend of
reducing layers of managerial hierarchy and "empowering" workers
at lower levels of the organization, 2 this distinction may become a
more difficult one for the courts to make. In any event, it will be
interesting to follow the extent to which the Montana Supreme
Court develops this further distinction in the future.
C.

Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co.

Donald Cecil started working in 1981 as a top executive for the
defendant.7 3 In early 1988 he was passed over for a promotion to
president of the company although he had been informed it was
"likely" he would receive this position.7 4 Nevertheless, he was at
this same time promoted to the position of company executive vice
president, told that his job was "secure," and given a raise. 5 Mr.
Cecil was a good employee and had "no performance deficiencies
76
on his record.
On July 18, 1988, however, Mr. Cecil's employment with the
company was terminated effective immediately. He was given no
prior warning of possible discharge or indeed any indication of
poor performance. On September 29, 1988, Mr. Cecil filed suit al69. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (excluding supervisors from coverage under the Act).
70. See Youngblood, Trevino & Favia, Reactions to Unjust Dismissal and Third
Party Dispute Resolution: A Justice Framework, forthcoming in Employ. Resp. and Rts. J.
(1992). See also Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1941-42 (1983).
71. See Parmerlee, Near & Jensen, Correlatesof Whistleblowers' Perceptionsof Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 17 (1982); Near & Miceli, Retaliation Against
Whistle Blowers: Predictorsand Effects, 71 J. APPL. PsY. 137 (1986).
72. See Fortune, May 7, 1990 at 53; Swasy & Hymowitz, The Workplace Revolution,
Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1991 at R6, col. 1.
73. 244 Mont. 405, 406, 797 P.2d 232, 233 (1990).
74. Id. at 407, 797 P.2d at 233.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 408, 797 P.2d at 234.
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leging "wrongful discharge" pursuant to the WDFEA. 7
The issue in the case was what constituted a "legitimate business reason" for discharge under the WDFEA. The company
claimed that the reason it fired Mr. Cecil was an anticipated decline in the price of crude oil. Falling crude oil prices meant that
the company would be operating fewer drilling rigs and would have
to cut back on expenditures. The Montana Supreme Court stated
that "economic conditions" constitute a "legitimate business reason" for an employer to act to reduce his or her workforce.7 8 The
court further stated that employers "must be given discretion" as
' Thus, in
to who they will "employ and retain in employment."79
the court's opinion, the burden fell on the plaintiff to show some
other non-economic motive or reason for his termination. Since the
plaintiff in the instant case did not proffer any such alternative
rationale, his case was dismissed.8 0
Interestingly, the Montana Supreme Court did not focus, as it
did in Buck,8 on the fact that the plaintiff was an "upper echelon"
employee and that the employer thus had broader discretion with
regard to discharging him. Instead, in Cecil, the court simply
stated that Montana employers still, under the WDFEA, retained
broad authority to terminate employees for real economic reasons,
and that absent some showing by plaintiffs of other motivations for
such terminations, terminations of this kind would be upheld.
Thus, the Cecil case establishes that while under the WDFEA
Montana employers cannot discharge employees without "good
cause," even "anticipated" economic reversals meet the requisite
test of "cause" for discharge.
IV.

SECTION

A.

912 PREEMPTION

Overview

Section 912 of the WDFEA states that the provisions of the
Act do not apply to discharges which are "subject to any other
state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for
contesting the dispute. '8 2 This section goes on to say that such
statutes include "those that prohibit discharge for filing complaints, charges, or claims with administrative bodies or that pro77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 409, 797 P.2d at 234.
Id.
Id. at 409-10, 797 P.2d at 234-35.
See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1991).
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hibit unlawful discrimination" based on a variety of criteria. 3 Section 912 also mandates that the WDFEA does not apply to a
discharge of an employee "covered by a written collective bargaining agreement or a written contract of employment for a specific
term."8 4 In three recent cases, Deeds v. Decker Coal Co.,8" Irving v.
87
86
School District No. 1-1A, and Fellows v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
the Montana Supreme Court has discussed the parameters of Section 912 of the WDFEA.
B.

Deeds v. Decker Coal Co.

In Deeds8 8 the Montana Supreme Court dealt directly with interpreting the first part of section 912 of the WDFEA, its exemption of discharges subject to state or federal statutes. The case involved 152 employees who were discharged by the company for
strike misconduct.8 9 These and other employees had gone on strike
when their union's collective bargaining agreement with the company expired on October 1, 1987. At the end of the strike, on June
28, 1988, the company recalled various of the strikers but refused
to reinstate the above-referenced 152 employees because of "serious strike misconduct." 90 These 152 discharged employees filed
charges with the U.S. National Labor Relations Board claiming
that their discharges represented unlawful retaliation for union activity, and also filed charges in Montana state court for "wrongful
discharge" under the WDFEA. In the Montana state court action
the employer successfully moved for dismissal of the case because
the plaintiffs were already pursuing the issue before the U.S. National Labor Relations Board pursuant to the U.S. National Labor
Relations Act, and because under section 912 the WDFEA does
not apply to discharges that are subject to a federal statute. The
plaintiffs appealed this issue to the Montana Supreme Court. 1
The plaintiffs focused their appeal on the specific language of
section 912 of the WDFEA. They first contended that their labor
relations dispute was not covered by section 912 because it did not
deal with "discrimination" and that all of the statute's exemptions
83.

Id.

84.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1991).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

246 Mont.
248 Mont.
244 Mont.
246 Mont.
Id. at 222,
Id.
Id.

220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990).
460, 813 P.2d 417 (1991).
7, 795 P.2d 484 (1990).
220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990).
805 P.2d at 1271.
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were purportedly based on "unlawful discrimination. ' '9 ' The Montana Supreme Court dismissed this contention stating that the list
of causes of action in section 912(1) was "not meant to be all inclusive" and pointing to the section's additional language exempting
from WDFEA coverage claims brought on "other similar
grounds. ' ' 3
The court then went on, however, to hold that the cause of
action was not covered by section 912 of the WDFEA, and that the
152 employees could thus bring a case for "wrongful discharge"
under the WDFEA in Montana state court. The court's decision
centered on the fact that "no other state or federal statute providing a procedure or remedy for contesting the dispute" had yet
taken effect. 4 The Montana Supreme Court distinguished between
the filing of a "charge" with the U.S. National Labor Relations
Board, and the Board's issuance of a formal "complaint." Under
NLRB procedures the filing by an employee or group of employees
of a "charge" alleging an unfair labor practice by an employer begins the procedure in an unfair labor practice case." The NLRB
then investigates the "charge" and if it finds that an unfair labor
practice has probably occurred it issues a "complaint" in the case,
setting the stage for an administrative law proceeding.96
The Montana Supreme Court in Deeds held that only if the
NLRB should "eventually decide to enter into the dispute by filing
a complaint on behalf of the discharged employees" would a "procedure or remedy for contesting the dispute" be set in motion, triggering the statutory exemption under section 912.91 Since no formal "complaint" had yet been issued in the case, no such
"procedure" had yet taken place, and the Montana Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiffs should be permitted to bring a case for
"wrongful discharge" in state court under the WDFEA.9 9
If NLRB procedure is examined from a more formalistic perspective it appears that the initial "charge" filed by an employee or
labor organization sets the Board's unfair labor practice determination process in motion. By permitting parties to file cases in
92. Id.
93. Id. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271. It also seems that the court could have rejected this
assertion that the plaintiffs' claims before the NLRB likely did involve "discrimination"
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
94. 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271.
95. See J. Getman & J. Blackburn, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE & POLICY 52 (2d
ed. 1983).
96. Id.
97. 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271.
98. Id. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271-72.
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state court pending NLRB investigation of a case, the Montana
Supreme Court seems to be setting up a situation where if the
NLRB does issue a "complaint" there will be duplicative causes of
action before both a federal administrative law judge (under the
National Labor Relations Act) and a state trial court (under the
WDFEA). Even if the Montana Supreme Court is reluctant to allow the filing of a "charge" with the NLRB to totally prohibit an
employee from pursuing a cause of action under the WDFEA, it
could at least emulate the procedure followed under section 911 of
the Act with respect to requiring employee exhaustion of written
employer internal grievance procedures before filing under the
WDFEA 99 Thus, employees could be prohibited from filing under
the WDFEA pending NLRB investigation of their unfair labor
practice "charge." As with employee exhaustion of internal grievance procedures, the one year statute of limitations under the
WDFEA would be tolled for up to 120 days pending the completion of the NLRB's investigation. If the NLRB decided not to issue a "complaint" in the case, the party would then be free to file
in state court under the WDFEA. In any event, the possibility of
duplicative causes of action before the NLRB and the state courts
raised by the Montana Supreme Court in Deeds does not seem to
be a positive one, and the issue appears to be ripe for further consideration by both the Montana Legislature and the Montana Supreme Court.
C.

Irving v. School Dist. No. 1-1A

Irving involved a high school teacher who was employed for
three years, but whose contract was not renewed for the requisite
fourth year needed to receive tenure.'0 0 The school district justified
its action by maintaining that the plaintiff's job was eliminated as
part of a necessary reduction-in-force. The plaintiff, however,
maintained that she was the victim of "continual harassment" and
among a variety of allegations asserted a violation of the
WDFEA.' ° ' The majority of the Montana Supreme Court summarily upheld a lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's WDFEA
claim pursuant to section 912 of the Act. The court noted that section 912(2) holds that the WDFEA does not apply to a discharge of
an employee "covered by a written collective bargaining agreement."'' 2 Because the plaintiff was covered by such an agreement
99.
100.
101.
102.

§ 39-2-911(2) (1991).
248 Mont. 460, 463, 813 P.2d 417, 419 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 469, 813 P.2d at 422.
MONT. CODE ANN.
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at all relevant times, she was barred from bringing a cause of action under the Act.'0 3
The court's decision, however, brought a strong dissent from
Justices Trieweiler and Hunt charging that the court, from an "inadequate record," had issued an "expansive decision" denying a
plaintiff's rights.'0 4 These justices noted that while the plaintiff
had "absolutely no rights" under the requisite collective bargaining
agreement, she was precluded from recovery under the WDFEA
and through other avenues because she was formally covered by a
collective bargaining agreement during the relevant time period.' 0
They pointed out that such an approach seemed to "leave untenured teachers uniquely unprotected under Montana law from
retaliatory action by their employers."' 0 6 These justices felt that
based on the record in the instant case, they were "unwilling to
07
arrive at such a sweeping conclusion.'
D.

Fellows v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

The plaintiff in Fellows started working for Sears, Roebuck in
1975 as a store clerk.'0 8 In 1984, at the request of management, she
transferred to a position as a service clerk. At the time of the
transfer, the plaintiff averred that the company's store manager assured her that the transfer would not affect her seniority and that
she could transfer back to her former position at any time.'0 9 In
both the store clerk and service clerk positions, the plaintiff was
represented by a union and covered by a collective bargaining
agreement." ' In late 1987 the plaintiff was laid off from her service
clerk position, and about a year later her employment in this position was formally terminated."' Her request at that time to be
transferred back to her former store clerk position was denied, and
she filed suit in state court on a variety of grounds including
"wrongful discharge.""' The state court dismissed her suit on the
grounds that it was preempted by federal labor law which establishes a federal district court cause of action for disputes regarding
collective bargaining contracts entered into pursuant to the Na103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108,
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 471, 813 P.2d at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id.
244 Mont. 7, 8, 795 P.2d 484, 484 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9, 795 P.2d at 485.
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tional Labor Relations Act." 3 The Montana Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, holding that the plaintiff's assertions involved interpretation of her collective bargaining
agreement and that this is to be done under federal law in federal
1
district court.
Interestingly, the court never mentioned section 912 of the
WDFEA, which exempts from WDFEA coverage employees covered by a written collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the
plaintiff apparently did allege in her amended complaint a violation of the WDFEA."I Perhaps even more interesting, though, is
that the court in its July 17, 1990 opinion failed to mention the
United States Supreme Court's 1988 opinion in Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc."6 In Lingle the United States Supreme Court held that state wrongful discharge claims in tort
raised by unionized employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements are not preempted by federal labor law if no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required.1 1 7 While
it is unclear from the opinion whether the plaintiff pleaded any
tort violations, it seems somewhat surprising that a case as important as Lingle to the general issue at bar was not cited. In any
event, the Montana Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Fellows is
not one that effectively elucidates the current status of the law on
several important issues.
V.

SECTION

A.

913

PREEMPTION

Overview

As developed above,"' the preemption of common-law remedies contained in section 913 of the WDFEA has been at the heart
of the controversy over the constitutionality of the Act. Section
913 states that except as provided in the Act, "no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or implied contract.""' 9 The
"tradeoff" involved in this statutory provision was affirmed by the
113. Id.; See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). See also Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (upholding the development of a federal
"common law" to enforce collective bargaining agreements under the National Labor Relations Act).
114. 244 Mont. at 10-11, 795 P.2d at 485-86.
115. Id. at 9, 795 P.2d at 485.
116. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
117. Id. at 409-10. For a good discussion of Lingle see Korn, Collective Rights and
Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149 (1990).
118. See supra notes 6-47 and accompanying text.
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (1991).
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Montana Supreme Court in Meech, and to date there has only
been one case before the court dealing with non-constitutional aspects of that provision. Moreover, that case, Martin v. Special Resource Management Inc.,'2 ° dealt with a procedural, as opposed to
substantive, interpretation issue.
B. Martin v. Special Resource Management, Inc.
Martin involved a dismissal of a long-time employee of a subsidiary of the Montana Power Company. On June 16, 1987, the
employee was informed that she would be terminated on July 17,
1987, due to a general company reduction-in-force.12 ' After receiving this notice, however, the employee became aware that her position was not going to be eliminated, but rather going to be filled by
the company's new president's personal secretary.'22 The plaintiff
instituted a suit in state court on June 28, 1988, alleging, among
other things, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.'2 3 The lower court ruled that the WDFEA, enacted
July 1, 1987, preempted this claim as the plaintiff's claim did not
fully accrue until the date of her termination, which was July 17,
1987.124

The plaintiff argued that an actionable cause for termination
in the case arose on her being notified of her termination on June
16, 1987. This date was before the WDFEA, and specifically section 913 of the WDFEA preempting common-law remedies, became effective. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and emphasized that it was the decision to terminate the plaintiff that
created the cause of action, and that this decision was made before
the WDFEA became effective. Accordingly, the plaintiff was al12 5
lowed to proceed with her common-law causes of action.
Once again, the Martin case is clearly a procedural one and
does not involve an interpretation of the substance of section 913
of the WDFEA. The case is important because it so dramatically
highlights the significance of section 913 of the Act. Because the
plaintiff was notified of her termination before July 1, 1987, she
was able to pursue common-law remedies for "wrongful discharge."
Employees notified of termination after July 1, 1987, however, cannot pursue such remedies, but must proceed under the WDFEA
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

246 Mont. 181, 803 P.2d 1086 (1990).
Id. at 182, 803 P.2d at 1087.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83, 803 P.2d at 1087.
Id. at 185, 803 P.2d at 1089.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1992

17

Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

despite the fact that they may perceive, as did the plaintiff in the
instant case, the common law approach to be more favorable. The
WDFEA clearly represents a dramatic shift in the way Montana
employees can attempt to redress what they perceive as an "unjust" dismissal.
VI.
A.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Burgess v. Lewis and Clark City-County Board of Health

The plaintiff in this case was employed at the Scratch Gravel
Sanitary Landfill District, a unit created by the Lewis and Clark
County Board of County Commissioners. 26 On July 1, 1988, the
Lewis and Clark City-County Board of Health was designated by
the County Commissioners as the Board of Directors for the Landfill District. On July 7, 1988, the Board of Health sent the plaintiff
a letter terminating his employment due to budgetary changes in
the new budget approved by the Board. The letter from the Board
encouraged the plaintiff to apply for a different position as a landfill equipment operator, although the Board then apparently hired
a different applicant for this position. 127 The plaintiff brought a
suit for "wrongful discharge" under the WDFEA, and the Board of
Health moved to dismiss under the theory that "governmental immunity" afforded under another Montana statute insulated acts of
the Lewis and Clark County Commissioners from suit under the
WDFEA.128 The lower court granted the Board of Health's motion
to dismiss, and the Montana Supreme Court ultimately affirmed.' 2 9
The issue before the Montana Supreme Court was whether an
employee of a local governmental entity could bring an action
under the WDFEA, or whether such an action was prohibited
under section 2-9-111 of the Montana Code Annotated 30 which at
the time stated that governmental entities are generally immune
from suits for their actions. The court noted that section 2-9-111
had been interpreted broadly, and that the section applied to the
Board of Health as an "agent" of the County Commissioners.
Thus, the Board of Health was immune from suit for "wrongful
discharge" under the WDFEA.' 3 '
The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the
WDFEA, since it was passed ten years after the 1977 governmental
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

244 Mont. 275, 796 P.2d 1079 (1990).
Id. at 276, 796 P.2d at 1080.

Id.
Id.

§ 2-9-111 (1989).
244 Mont. at 277, 796 P.2d at 1081.
MONT. CODE ANN.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/2

18

ierman and Youngblood: Interpreting Montana's Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge from Employment Ac

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE ACT

1992]

immunity statute, limited the county's immunity in the area of
"wrongful discharge." The Montana Supreme Court said that
nothing in the WDFEA suggested a legislative intent to grant recovery where immunity statutes had previously denied recovery.
The court held that the plaintiff had failed to present "any logical
support" for his contention in this regard. 3' 2
The Montana Supreme Court in Burgess thus broadly limited
the applicability of the WDFEA to local governmental employees
in the state. In 1991, however, the Montana Legislature, in possible
response to the Burgess decision, amended section 2-9-111 of the
Montana Code. These amendments narrowed the definition of
"legislative act" in the statute, and specifically stated that "administrative actions undertaken in the execution of a law or public policy" were not to be entitled to immunity from suit under the statute.13 3 This amendment would appear to permit suits by local
governmental employees under the WDFEA, at least to the extent
such suits are not otherwise statutorily preempted.

VII.

EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS

A.

Overview

Of all the areas involving judicial encroachment on the strict
doctrine of "employment-at-will," the area of "employee handbooks" has perhaps been the most explosive. Over the past decade,
courts in a majority of states have held that promises embodied in
employers' personnel handbooks may be legally binding on employers. 3 4 Montana is, however, the first state to hold by statute
that employer violations of written personnel policies are unlawful.1 35 Section 904 of the WDFEA directly states that a discharge is
"wrongful" under the statute if the employer "violated the express
provisions of its own written personnel policy."1 36 To date, the
Montana Supreme Court has interpreted section 904 in only one
1 37
case, Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc.
B.

The Buck Case and Employee Handbooks

While the Montana Supreme Court in Buck generally affirmed
132. Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111(c)(ii) (1991).
134. See Note, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments On The Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 208-09 and n.
76 (1990).
135. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(3) (1991).
136. Id.
137. 248 Mont. 276, 811 P.2d 537 (1991).

133.
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the plaintiff's discharge for "good cause" under the WDFEA, it remanded to the lower court a claim by the plaintiff that his discharge was in violation of the employer's own written personnel
policies and thus constituted a violation of section 904(3) of the
WDFEA. The plaintiff maintained that various provisions of the
dealership's written employment manual assured his continued
employment so long as his performance and the economic circumstances remained "satisfactory."13 8 Since there was no question
about his job performance, and there was no evidence as to poor
"economic circumstances" for the dealership, the plaintiff argued
that his discharge represented a violation of the dealership's employment manual and was unlawful under section 904(3) of the
1 39
WDFEA.
Discussing the plaintiff's contentions, the Montana Supreme
Court cited one specific provision from the Billings Montana Chevrolet dealership's handbook which stated: "[olur dealership is still
growing. You are thus assured of steady employment as long as
you are producing for us. We expect each of our employees to be
maximum producers, always doing their part in accomplishing our
business objectives."' 40 The court then noted the plaintiff's contentions that he never failed to "produce" for the company. It also
noted, however, that the company did offer the plaintiff alternative
employment as a fleet manager, which the plaintiff turned down."'
But the court went on to further note that the plaintiff stated
"that he did not accept this position because he did not think it
was a genuine offer and would actually result in a later dismissal."" The Montana Supreme Court held that if the above facts
were true the plaintiff might have a cause of action under section
904(3) of the Act, and remanded the issue to the lower court "to
determine the effect of language of the handbook" and whether the
4 3
offer of another job was made in "good faith.'
The Montana Supreme Court in Buck appears to be giving a
fairly wide range of latitude to the language contained in section
904(3) of the WDFEA. Section 904 of the Act speaks of employer
violations of "express" provisions of employer personnel policy,
and it seems that the language contained in the Billings Chevrolet
handbook was not extraordinarily "express." The assurance of
138. Id. at 284, 811 P.2d at 542.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 285, 811 P.2d at 542.
143. Id-
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"steady employment" turned on employees continuing to be "producing" and doing their part in accomplishing the dealership's
"business objectives.""" Certainly, one could argue that with the
sale of the dealership the dealership's "business objectives" clearly
shifted, and the kind of special "production" the former owner's
son-in-law offered was no longer all that significant. In any event,
future interpretation of section 904(3) will clearly be an important
part of the WDFEA.

VIII.

FUTURE ISSUES

The cases decided to date by the Montana Supreme Court in
many respects raise as many questions as they settle. Certainly,
the Buck and Cecil cases have not fully explicated the perhaps
most critical section of the WDFEA, section 903(5) defining "good
cause," and the Montana Supreme Court has appeared reluctant to
follow the precedents established in this area in arbitral and other
forums.1 ' " In addition, the lower echelon/upper echelon employee
dichotomy set forth by the court in Buck also clearly needs to be
better clarified.
While the constitutionality of the Act now seems fairly well
established (despite some of the loose ends exposed in the
Ailmaras case), some of the issues discussed at length in Meech as
part of the constitutional debate still seem to be quite alive. Indeed, as the Deeds case illustrates, the precise parameters of section 912's federal, state, and collective bargaining exemptions, for
one, need to be much better established.
Moreover, there are a host of issues that need to be addressed
regarding the efficacy of the day-to-day operation of the Act. Are
parties pursuing cases under the Act despite its statutory limits on
monetary relief? (To date it appears that they are, despite
Harvard Law Professor Paul Weiler's concerns that the statute's
cap on recoveries would make it difficult for aggrieved parties to
find lawyers willing to take their cases.) 4" What about the options
afforded parties under section 914 of the Act'4 7 to resolve disputes
through arbitration rather than litigation? Are parties taking full
advantage of this effective alternative dispute resolution
144.
145.

Id. at 284, 811 P.2d at 542.
See generally M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS: A LEGAL AND ARBITRAL ANALYSIS (1986); see also Summers, Arbitration of Unjust Dismissal: A Preliminary
Proposal, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 159 (1976).
146. See Weiler, supra note 4.
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1991).
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method? 4 8 (To date, the sketchy evidence indicates that they may
not be taking such full advantage.) These and other important
questions are worthy of further exploration and investigation.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Over the last fifteen years there has been a torrent of judicial
activity modifying various aspects of the rigid "employment-atwill" doctrine. Nevertheless, only one state, Montana, has to date
enacted comprehensive legislation protecting employees from
"wrongful discharge." The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws' recently proposed model "Employment
Termination Act" (similar to the Montana statute) may help set
the stage for the enactment of legislation of this kind in other
4 9 Consequently, the
states.1
initial interpretations of the Montana
statute by the Montana Supreme Court are of interest not only to
those in Montana, but to observers throughout the country who
view the WDFEA as a model for reform in their own jurisdictions.
For as "wrongful discharge" protection for all employees in the
country becomes more of a reality,' the State of Montana will
continue to be at the vanguard of reform.

148. In his pathbreaking articles advocating "wrongful discharge" legislation Professor
Clyde Summers advocated the use of arbitration to resolve all "wrongful discharge" disputes. See Summers, supra note 2, Individual Protection;Summers, Arbitration Of Unjust
Dismissals, supra note 145.
149. Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at 1, col. 5; Jackson & Schantz, A New Frontier In
Wrongful Discharge, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1991 at 101.
150. Professor Alan Krueger, for example, feels that the further enactment of state
legislation of this kind is inevitable. See Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-DismissalLegislation in the United States, 44 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 644, 658 (1991).
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